Lesson test: Alternatives and Frankfurt cases

Sign in

Libre University uses your GitHub account. Signing in is only needed to sit a final test, so the score is kept on your profile.

Alternatives and Frankfurt cases

1.[2p]
What is the principle of alternate possibilities?

A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

Correct

A person acts freely only if his action is undetermined

The answer is: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

Every action has at least two possible outcomes

The answer is: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

A person is responsible only for actions he intended

The answer is: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

2.[3p]
Put the elements of a Frankfurt case in the order they occur.

A device is installed that will force the decision if needed
The device stays idle and plays no part in what happens
The agent decides on his own, for his own reasons
A prior indicator shows which way the agent is about to decide

Show the answer

a, b, c, d

3.[3p]
What is Frankfurt's diagnostic point about ordinary excusing cases?

There the inability to do otherwise also explains why the agent acted, and the excuse works through that

Correct

There the agent always intends the outcome

The answer is: There the inability to do otherwise also explains why the agent acted, and the excuse works through that

There the agent is never aware of the constraint

The answer is: There the inability to do otherwise also explains why the agent acted, and the excuse works through that

There the constraint is physical rather than psychological

The answer is: There the inability to do otherwise also explains why the agent acted, and the excuse works through that

4.[3p]
What is the first horn of the dilemma defence?

If the prior indicator determines the decision, the case assumes determinism and begs the question

Correct

If the prior indicator determines the decision, the agent has an alternative after all

The answer is: If the prior indicator determines the decision, the case assumes determinism and begs the question

If the device never fires, the agent was not really constrained

The answer is: If the prior indicator determines the decision, the case assumes determinism and begs the question

If the agent is responsible, the principle is true after all

The answer is: If the prior indicator determines the decision, the case assumes determinism and begs the question

5.[3p]
What is the second horn?

If the connection is only probabilistic, the intervener cannot rely on the indicator and must act too early

Correct

If the connection is only probabilistic, the agent is not responsible for anything

The answer is: If the connection is only probabilistic, the intervener cannot rely on the indicator and must act too early

If the connection is only probabilistic, determinism is false

The answer is: If the connection is only probabilistic, the intervener cannot rely on the indicator and must act too early

If the connection is only probabilistic, the device is unnecessary

The answer is: If the connection is only probabilistic, the intervener cannot rely on the indicator and must act too early

6.[2p]
What is the name for the thin residual alternative left in some Frankfurt cases? Three words, starting "flicker".

CorrectNot quite: flicker of freedom

7.[2p]
A robust alternative must be something the agent could voluntarily have done as an exercise of control.

True

Correct

False

The answer is: True

8.[3p]
What changed in the debate after 1969?

Select all that apply

Leeway views and source views became distinct positions

Correct

Incompatibilists had to argue that determinism spoils sourcehood, not just alternatives

Correct

Semi-compatibilism became possible: no leeway, but responsibility intact

Correct

The Consequence Argument was shown to be invalid

The answer is: Leeway views and source views became distinct positions, Incompatibilists had to argue that determinism spoils sourcehood, not just alternatives, Semi-compatibilism became possible: no leeway, but responsibility intact

9.[2p]
In which year did Frankfurt publish the counterexample?

CorrectNot quite: 1969

1.[2p] What is the principle of alternate possibilities?

2.[3p] Put the elements of a Frankfurt case in the order they occur.

3.[3p] What is Frankfurt's diagnostic point about ordinary excusing cases?

4.[3p] What is the first horn of the dilemma defence?

5.[3p] What is the second horn?

6.[2p] What is the name for the thin residual alternative left in some Frankfurt cases? Three words, starting "flicker".

7.[2p] A robust alternative must be something the agent could voluntarily have done as an exercise of control.

8.[3p] What changed in the debate after 1969?

9.[2p] In which year did Frankfurt publish the counterexample?

1.[2p]
What is the principle of alternate possibilities?

2.[3p]
Put the elements of a Frankfurt case in the order they occur.

3.[3p]
What is Frankfurt's diagnostic point about ordinary excusing cases?

4.[3p]
What is the first horn of the dilemma defence?

5.[3p]
What is the second horn?

6.[2p]
What is the name for the thin residual alternative left in some Frankfurt cases? Three words, starting "flicker".

7.[2p]
A robust alternative must be something the agent could voluntarily have done as an exercise of control.

8.[3p]
What changed in the debate after 1969?

9.[2p]
In which year did Frankfurt publish the counterexample?